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WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, DARIN G. 
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FOREST SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
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(subject to pour-over 
jurisdiction) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case arises from injuries suffered by Plaintiff in a 
multi-vehicle automobile accident which took place in Davis County, 
State of Utah, on December 10, 1989. Jurisdiction and venue were 
deemed by the Court to be proper in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, State of Utah. 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to §78-2-
2(3) (j), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1992), and Article VIII 
Section 5, Constitution of Utah. This case is subject to the pour-
over jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah 
Code Ann (1953, as amended 1992). 
ISSUES 
The parties at issue in this appeal were dismissed from the 
proceedings on motions for summary judgment. The Court in its 
Amended Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment framed 
the issue as follows: 
The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged 
by plaintiff, whether plaintiff's allegations can support 
a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. 
For the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will 
assume without deciding that plaintiff has alleged 
sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part 
of the defendants. 
Therefore, Plaintiff will frame the issues as follows: 
1. When viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, was 
the negligence of John Doe No. 1 (the unidentified semi-truck 
driver) a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries? 
2. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, was the negligence of Jennifer MacArthur a proximate 
cause of the injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiff? 
3. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, was the negligence of Defendant Woolstenhulme a 
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff? 
4. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, was the negligence of Defendant Colovich a proximate 
cause of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an appeal from the granting of Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The Trial Court determined that "no direct 
evidence exists as to the issue of causation as to these 
Defendants." 
A trial court's grant of summary judgement is reviewed under 
a "correctness" standard. Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc., 771 P.2d 1100, 11001-02 (Utah App.), cert denied, 783 P.2d 
53 (Utah 1989). The Appellate Court should accord no deference to 
the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor 
the court's legal conclusions based on those facts. See Wycalis v. 
Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App 1989), cert denied, 789 
P. 2d 33 (Utah 1990). When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, the facts are to be liberally construed "in favor of the 
parties opposing the motion, and those parties are to be given the 
benefit of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
This case was determined by summary judgment entered by the 
Court, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 
provides: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
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declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed 
for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
Utah Law appears unclear with regard to "superseding 
intervening cause" and the conflicts created between Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) and Hillvard v. Utah 
By-Prodcuts Co.. 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953). A question presented is 
whether "foreseeability" of an intervening act is a question of 
fact or law. 
Plaintiff believes the following authority is also 
determinative in this case, Harris, id. , Godesky v. Provo City 
Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), Restatement of Torts. Second, 
sections 442 A, 442 B, and 444, Jensen v. Mountain States Tel, and 
Tel. Co. , 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), Steffensen v. Smiths Management 
Corp.. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991), Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A- FACTS 
1. On December 10, 1989, at approximately 8:40 p.m., 
Plaintiff was a passenger in a automobile being driven by appellee 
MacArthur. (Clark p.55 1.6-9) 
2. Plaintiff suffered personal injuries as a result of 
multiple car automobile collision which occurred on the State Road 
89 overpass over 1-15 southbound in Farmington City, Davis County, 
State of Utah. The collision on structure 3C-594, as point 7 miles 
south of milepost 334. (R.6 520). 
3. Accident investigation and reconstruction established 
that the collision sequence was initiated after Defendant Gilbert 
lost control of his vehicle and came to rest, stalled, in the right 
hand lane of traffic. (R.630; deposition of Gilbert p.14 1.9 to 
p.16 1.16.) 
4. Rita Kennedy then approached the accident area, where she 
observed Gilbert's car stopped in the middle of the two southbound 
lanes and a person standing outside the car waiving his hands. 
Rita swerved to the left to avoid the car, as she did so she lost 
control of the vehicle, struck the guardrail several times and her 
vehicle came to rest in the roadway. Rita exited her vehicle and 
saw oncoming vehicles. One of these vehicles was semi-
tractor/ trailer. She feared that her vehicle would be struck by 
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these vehicles. She jumped over the guardrail to the east and did 
not see any collision events after jumping over the guardrail. 
(R.273) 
5. The next vehicle into the accident scene was John Doe #1, 
the unidentified semi-truck. John Doe #1 veered suddenly from the 
right hand lane to the left hand lane, presumably to avoid striking 
Gilbert, and "cut off" the MacArthur vehicle which was closing 
rapidly on the semi from behind. The semi made no contact with any 
other vehicle and proceeded down the road. (R. 629, f 7; R. 272, 
Deposition of Greg DuVal, exhibit 1, investigators report). 
6. Appellee MacArthur was driving southbound on U.S. 89 
entering 1-15. MacArthur was traveling approximately 60-65 miles 
per hour. (Deposition of Clark, p.5 1.20; R.330) 
7. The MacArthur car had been passing other vehicles on the 
roadway (Clark p. 58 1. 2) and seemed to be gaining on the truck as 
it swung in front of MacArthur (Clark p.57 1. 16). 
8. Defendant MacArthur attempted to take evasive actions 
from the semi by braking and turning. This caused the car to go to 
of control and come to rest against the left hand guardrail facing 
backwards into on coming traffic. (R.629; deposition of MacArthur 
p.14 1.2-4 and p.15 1.24 to p.16 1.2) 
9. Clark remembers seeing Gilbert approach the MacArthur car 
saying he was sorry, his car had stalled and he needed help. Brad 
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Clark thought he should get out of the car to help Gilbert. Brad 
Clark does not remember exiting the car and has no memory until 
after he was placed on a stretcher by the paramedics. (Clark p.59 
1.21 to p.61 1.1). Gilbert does not remember seeing Clark exit the 
car. Appellee MacArthur remembers Brad opening the rear door of 
the vehicle as if to get out. (MacArthur p.18 1.6-7, p.19 1.20-
21) . 
10. Appellees Hopkins and Woolstenhulme were stopped side by 
side on a red light southbound on Highway 89 about to enter the 
freeway interchange. Hopkins (p.15 1.14 to p.15 1.24; R. 629). 
Defendant Woolstenhulme drove a four wheel drive Chevrolet pick-up 
truck which was in four wheel drive at the time. Defendant Hopkins 
drove a jeep Cherokee which was in two wheel drive. (Hopkins p.22 
1.14-16). Both vehicles proceeded on the green light. (Hopkins 
p.20 1.18, et seq.) Woolstenhulme in an initial interview stated 
that he saw the semi-tractor "cut off" the MacArthur vehicle, the 
MacArthur vehicle go out of control and strike the guardrail. 
(DuVal, exhibit 1; R.272; R.629 19). 
11. Despite what he had seen and being in four wheel drive, 
appellee Woolstenhulme drove into the accident scene and crashed 
into at least one pedestrian, struck the MacArthur and Kennedy 
vehicles. Woolstenhulme came to rest sideways in the road, 
blocking the left hand lane. (Woolstenhulme p. 11, 1.10 to p. 12 1. 
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18, DuVal p.49 1.16-19; R. 628 flO). 
12. Defendant Hopkins witnessed the vehicles on the road and 
the other crashes and came to a stop in the left hand lane prior to 
the accident location. Hopkins was then bumped from the rear by 
Defendant Adamson who went on to strike the side of appellee 
Woolstenhulme's truck (Hopkins p.15 1.14 to p.16 1.24; R. 628 f 11) . 
13. Hopkins remained stopped in the road before being struck 
from the rear by appellee Colovich at a high rate of speed. 
Hopkins' vehicle then collided with the front of MacArthur's 
vehicle, causing the MacArthur vehicle to move further backward (or 
forward depending on perspective) before the vehicles came to a 
rest. (Colovich p.15 1.15-19; R. 628 112). 
14. Rita Kennedy, who had exited her vehicle and jumped over 
the guardrail for safety, had been over the guardrail for "a few 
seconds when Brad Clark came flying over the guardrail". (R.628 
J13; R.272; DuVal exhibit 1 p.3). 
15. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his person including 
derangement of the right knee, severed anterior cruciate ligament 
and a femoral condile lesion; a sever laceration of the fist web 
space of his right hand, transecting the first dorsal interosseous 
muscle as well as the insertion, the IP joint tendon was partially 
shredded and over 50% transected and the ulnar digital nerve was 
severed. The flexor pollices longus tendon was also severed from 
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the bone. The Appellant suffered special damages in excess of 
$21,000. (R.3 J[30) • 
16. Appellee MacArthur was injured while sitting in her 
vehicle as a result of subsequent collisions (MacArthur p. 11 1.2-4, 
p.19 1.11-15). MacArthur suffered injuries to her leg and knee, 
leaving her temporarily unable to walk, her face was badly cut, 
swollen and bandaged and her jaws were wire shut (MacArthur p.17 
1.9-12; Clark p.62 1.6). 
17. From the time appellee MacArthur's vehicle came to a rest 
until the last collision seemed to happen "instantly" (MacArthur 
p.56 1.1-6; R. 379 f 8). 
18. Plaintiff's expert Greg DuVal stated his opinion with 
some additional specific claims that appellees Colovich and 
Woolstenhulme were guilty of driving too fast for existing 
conditions. (DuVal p.109 1.18-25; p.121 1.2-16). 
19. Plaintiff's expert Greg DuVal stated his opinion based on 
adequate foundation excluded here, that Brad Clark was most likely 
injured as a result of the impact between appellee Woolstenhulme 
and appellee MacArthur. (DuVal p.60 1.8-11) 
20. Plaintiff retained the services of Dave Stephens as a 
human factors expert. Stephens was asked in his deposition whether 
he had an opinion of how Brad Clark was injured. It was Dave 
Stephens opinion that Plaintiff was most likely injured as a result 
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of being struck directly by the Hopkins jeep after it was hit and 
pushed forward by appellee Colovich, or he may have been struck 
directly by appellee Colovich. (Stephens p.37 1.25, R.590) 
B. NATURE OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDINGS. 
A negligence action was filed by Plaintiff seeking recovery 
for personal injuries suffered in the multi-vehicle automobile 
collision. As a result of injuries suffered in the accident, 
Plaintiff claims special damages in excess of $21,000. 
Based upon the initial investigation and reconstruction, it 
was believed that Plaintiff was likely injured when the MacArthur 
vehicle was struck in head-on fashion by the Woolstenhulme vehicle, 
or as a result of a chain of collisions caused by the improper 
lookout of Defendant Colovich. Plaintiff's expert rendered an 
opinion that all drivers involved in the accident were negligent in 
failing to maintain a proper lookout and in driving too fast for 
existing conditions, in addition to other negligence. Defendant 
John Doe was additionally negligent in making a lane change when it 
could not be done with reasonable safety. The evasive maneuver of 
the semi truck was witnessed by Plaintiff and Defendant MacArthur, 
thereby constituting a hit and run which would be subject to 
insurance coverage under the Farmers Uninsured Motorist 
endorsement. Following the investigation and reconstruction of the 
accident, and Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation against the 
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named parties. 
On or about January 28, 1992, Defendant Hopkins filed a motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation. That 
matter was briefed, the Court denied that motion on January 30, 
1992. Thereafter, Plaintiff made partial settlements in this case 
with Defendant King (July 29, 1991) ; Defendant Adamson (October 22, 
1992); Defendant Hopkins (December 30, 1992); Defendant Holbrook 
(December 4, 1992); and Defendant Gilbert (August 6, 1993). 
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claim against Rita M. Kennedy 
and the U.S. Forest Service on February 10, 1994. All remaining 
parties and causes of action were concluded by the Court's order of 
summary judgment June 13, 1994. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Preliminary Matters 
THE TORT REFORM ACT REQUIRES JOINDER OF ALL PARTIES SHARING ANY 
PROPORTION OF LIABILITY 
Pursuant to the Tort Reform Act of 1986, Plaintiff was 
required in this action to join any Defendant who may have shared 
in the fault. Section 78-27-41 provides: 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is 
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective proportions 
of fault. 
Plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages attributable to 
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any Defendant who is not a party to the action. §78-27-38, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1986). No Defendant is liable for more 
than that Defendant's pro-rata share of fault, which again requires 
Plaintiff to join any party that may have caused or contributed to 
the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. §78-27-40, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended 1986). 
The Tort Reform Act of 1986 required Plaintiff to join any and 
all Defendants who may have shared any percentage of the fault 
resulting in the injuries suffered by Plaintiff herein. 
JOHN DOE NO. 1 IS AN UNINSURED MOTORIST UNDER 
THE FARMERS' POLICY 
This issue does not require much discussion, but is presented 
simply to clarify any questions that may arise in the Court's mind 
regarding the actions and propriety of John Doe #1 being named as 
a party to this action. 
This action arose after the amendment to the Safety 
Responsibility Act of 1987. The uninsured motorist statute is 
codified as §31A-22-305, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1987). 
The applicable sections provided the following at the time this 
accident occurred: 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" 
includes: 
. . . (c) any person occupying a motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer; 
* * * 
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(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor 
vehicle" includes: 
. . . (b) an unidentified motor vehicle that left 
the scene of an accident proximately caused by its 
operator; 
* * * 
(5) When a covered person claims an uninsured motor 
vehicle under Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an 
accident without touching the covered person or the 
vehicle occupied by the covered person, then the covered 
person shall show the existence of the other motor 
vehicle by clear and convincing evidence, that consists 
of more than the covered person's testimony. 
The existence of John Doe #1 has been established by prior 
testimony of Brad Clark, appellee MacArthur and appellee 
Woolstenhulme. In addition, the presence of the semi is supported 
by the statement given by Rita Kennedy that she saw the semi 
approaching and exited her car and jumped over the guardrail. 
Therefore, the requirements of bringing a cause of action under the 
uninsured motorist statute have been met and John Doe #1 is a 
proper party to this action and is covered by appellee Farmers 
Insurance Group, dba Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
POINT I 
NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT 
TO BE DETERMINED BY JURY 
According to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment is only appropriate 
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
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issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
In a negligence action, the question of liability is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury. Silcox v. Skaaas 
Alpha Beta, Inc. , 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) , Hunt v. Hurst. 
785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990). 
Likewise, the issue of causation presents a question of fact 
to be determined by the jury. 
The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability 
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later 
negligence of another concurs to cause injury, if the 
later act were a foreseeable event. 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). Harris v. 
Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
The Godesky court further went on to state: 
An intervening negligent act does not automatically 
become a superseding cause that relieves the original 
actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with 
the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if 
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier 
negligent act is a concurring cause. "[T]his includes 
situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of 
others should reasonably be anticipated." (cites omitted) 
Godesky. at 545. 
The Trial Court, in his minute entry and ruling regarding this 
case assumed for the purpose of his minute entry that Plaintiff had 
alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of 
Defendants. This was consistent with the Memorandum of Defendant 
MacArthur, who at paragraph 4 of her principle memorandum (R.347) 
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stated "MacArthur assumes there are sufficient issues of fact 
regarding the claims of her negligence to preclude summary judgment 
on that issue. 
POINT II 
QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDE THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS TO JOHN DOE NO. 1. 
John Doe #1 was the unidentified semi driver who constitutes 
a hit and run driver subject to uninsured motorist coverage as 
specified in the second preliminary statement in this brief. John 
Doe #1 was covered by a policy issued by appellee Farmers Insurance 
Exchange who was represented by Robert Jeffs along with appellee 
MacArthur who was also represented by Robert Jeffs. 
It should be noted that at no time did Farmers Insurance 
Exchange or John Doe #1 file a Motion for Summary Judgement. The 
ruling of the trial court, entered sua sponte, granted summary 
judgment in favor of Farmers Insurance Exchange expressly on the 
theory of proximate cause. The facts provide that John Doe, 
without warning or notice, veered into the lane of travel of 
Defendant MacArthur causing her car to go out of control, spin and 
strike the guardrail. All the passengers in the MacArthur were 
injured. The question of uninsured coverage was neither brought 
before the Court nor addressed and the Court issued its ruling 
solely on the issue of proximate cause. The test for proximate 
cause as provided by the Utah Supreme Court in Harris v. Utah 
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Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), is stated 
Whether under the particular circumstances [defendant] 
should have foreseen that [defendant's] conduct would 
have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and 
this includes situations where negligent or other 
wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be 
anticipated. 
Harris at 220. 
John Doe had just approached an area of great hazard. 
Gilbert's car was parked in the middle of the two southbound lanes 
and Kennedy's car further up the road was stalled in the left hand 
southbound lane. Only through considerable effort, and running 
MacArthur off the road was John Doe able to navigate the hazard. 
It would be foreseeable to a motorist running another motorist off 
the road that the motorist run off the road may suffer injuries or 
damages as a result of that maneuver. Likewise, leaving a motorist 
stranded in a hazardous setting, such as the one existing at the 
time, would create a foreseeable danger for the motorist left on 
the high speed roadway in the dark. Questions of fact exist as to 
John Doe's negligence and that negligence creating a foreseeable 
risk of harm to the occupants of the MacArthur vehicle. The 
granting of judgment in favor of John Doe and Farmers Insurance 
Exchange was an error and should be set aside. The question of 
proximate cause should be submitted to the finder of fact. 
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POINT III 
QUESTIONS OF FACT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT MACARTHUR. 
Defendant MacArthur's motion for summary judgment claimed that 
Summary Judgment should be granted on two alternative grounds, 
either that MacArthur's negligence had "come to a rest before the 
actions or causes occurred which produced Plaintiff's injuries" 
(R.346) or that the actions of Plaintiff or other Defendants 
constituted an unforseeable independent intervening cause 
superseding Defendant MacArthur's acts (R.345, 344). 
It is established law that summary judgment is proper only if 
the evidence, depositions, affidavits and admissions, when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that 
there is no issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jensen v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). 
Defendant MacArthur acknowledged for the purpose of her motion 
that sufficient questions of fact existed to preclude summary 
judgment on the issue of liability. Therefore, this brief assumes 
an acknowledgment of duty and breach of duty, simply for the 
purpose of the arguments regarding proximate cause. 
The reason for this assumption is based upon the general 
factual circumstances surrounding the superseding, intervening 
cause theories of proximate causation. Those cases are generally 
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based upon the termination of a first parties negligence or where 
a second negligent act is deemed to be superseding. While summary 
judgment may be granted solely on the issue of proximate cause "in 
a situation involving independent intervening cause, the primary 
issue is one of the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent 
conduct of a third person, and in this case, that issue must be 
resolved by the finder of fact." Jensen, supra. 
[0]ne cannot excuse himself from liability arising from his 
negligent acts merely because the later negligence of another 
concurs to cause an injury, if the latter act was a legally 
foreseeable event. 
Jensen, at 365-6. 
Defendant MacArthur would now have the court believe that her 
negligence is terminated, as a matter of law, because subsequent 
negligence of other Defendants, and speculatory actions taken by 
Plaintiff, caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries. This is 
simply an inappropriate test. 
The theories of law relied upon by appellee MacArthur arise 
from the so called "first prong" of the rules stated in Hillyard v. 
Utah By-Products. 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953). Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) stated the rule as follows: 
* * * 
In other words, the test in Hillyard is two-pronged: (1) 
where a motorist sees a stationary object in the road and 
negligently fails to avoid it, his negligence is, as a 
matter of law, a superseding cause, but (2) if the 
motorist negligently fails to see the stationary object 
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in time to avoid it, the issue of whether the motorist's 
negligence is a superseding cause is for the jury. 
The case most heavily relied on in Hillyard to 
support the first prong of the rule here stated has been 
overruled. Kline v. Mover. 191 A. 43 (Pa 1937) , was 
expressly overruled by Grainy v. Campbell 425 A.2d 379 
(1981), which rejected the rule of superseding cause in 
Kline and adopted the rule stated in 447 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See also Henniaan v. 
Atlantic Refining Co.. 282 F. Supp. 667, 678-79 
* * * 
Finally, the unsound distinction made in Hillyard 
serves to frustrate the purpose of the Comparative 
Negligence Statute by precluding the kind of comparison 
of fault that a jury ought to make. The allocation of 
liability should be made on the basis of the relative 
culpability of both parties. To do that the jury must 
assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the 
second driver7s actions in light of all the 
circumstances, including whatever action it takes to 
avoid a collision, his initial speed, the initial speed 
of the first car, road conditions, traffic conditions and 
the like. 
To avoid further confusion in doctrine of 
superseding causation in cases such as this, we hereby 
overrule the first prong of the Hillyard test as stated 
in Hillyard, McMurdie, Valesquez, and Anderson. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant MacArthur negligently drove her vehicle, lost 
control and crashed into the guardrail. The question then 
presented is whether Plaintiff was injured in a "direct unbroken 
sequence which produces the injury." And whether the injury 
suffered by Plaintiff would have been incurred had Defendant 
MacArthur not been negligent. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 
541 (Utah 1984). Certainly, had MacArthur not lost control of her 
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vehicle, and crashed on the roadway, Plaintiff would not have been 
subsequently injured. MacArthur testified that the entire 
occurrence seemed to happen immediately, or "instantaneously11. As 
such, the injury happened in a direct unbroken sequence of events. 
The negligent action of others could reasonably have been 
anticipated in this case. The Kennedy vehicle had already gone out 
of control and was stalled in the number two or inside lane. The 
Gilbert vehicle had already stalled and was blocking the number one 
lane. There were no other lanes of travel, with the exception of 
an emergency lane on the right side of the road. The fact that 
three vehicles had already been involved in the accident should 
have been ample evidence that further collisions may take place. 
In addition, MacArthur would have the court believe that it is 
negligence, per se, for a person to exit a motor vehicle after an 
accident occurs. Defendant Kennedy exited her vehicle, and sought 
safety over the guardrail where she was found unharmed after the 
collision events occurred. In fact, with the exception of 
MacArthur and Heather Reeves, the passenger in the MacArthur 
vehicle, all parties involved in this motor vehicle accident exited 
their cars at some point. The exiting of the motor vehicle is 
neither unforeseeable, nor negligent. 
The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability 
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later 
negligence of another concurs to cause injury, if the 
later act were a foreseeable event. 
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Jensen, at 458; Harris, at 220. 
While Defendant MacArthur would have this Court rule that her 
negligence had "come to a rest," the Court should note that 
MacArthur and her passenger Heather Reeves remained in the 
MacArthur vehicle which was subsequently struck and both women 
received serious injuries. Remaining in the MacArthur vehicle was 
obviously a dangerous choice. On the other hand/ Defendant Kennedy 
exited her vehicle and sought shelter on the east side of the 
guardrail. Kennedy was not injured in the accident (See affidavit 
of Greg DuVal attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Hopkins' Motion for Summary Judgment incorporated herein 
by this reference). 
The courts have consistently held that the question of 
proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
While the Harris court overruled the first prong of the Hillyard 
test, partially based on the comparative negligence statute, the 
court stated the test of foreseeability as follows: 
In applying the test of foreseeability to situations 
where a negligently created pre-existing condition 
combined with a later act of negligence causing an 
injury, courts have drawn a clear cut distinction between 
two classes of cases....the second situation involves 
conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently 
fails to observe the dangerous condition until it is too 
late to avoid it.... With respect to the second 
situation, where the second actor fails to see the danger 
in time to avoid it, it is held that a jury question 
exists, based upon the rationale that it can reasonably 
be anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein 
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others may not observe the dangerous condition until too 
late to escape it. (emphasis added) 
Harris, at 221 
The Utah Supreme Court also held in Godesky "•..proximate 
causation is generally a matter of fact to be determined by the 
jury. Watters v. Querrv, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981). Godeskv v. 
Provo City, 69 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984). The Godeskv court 
further went on to state 
An intervening negligent act does not automatically 
become a superseding cause that relieves the original 
actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with 
the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if 
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier 
negligent act is a concurring cause. "[T]his includes 
situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of 
others should reasonably be anticipated." (cites omitted) 
Godesky, at 545. 
Further clarification can be obtained by review of the 
Restatement of Torts, Second. The restatement provides 
SECTION 442 A. Intervening Force Risked By Actor's 
Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases 
the foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of 
another force, and is a substantial factor in causing the 
harm, intervention is not a superseding cause. *** 
SECTION 442 B. Intervening Force Cause Causing Same Harm 
as That Risk by Actors Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases 
the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in 
causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about 
through the intervention of another force does not relieve the 
actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally 
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caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the 
risk created by the actors conduct. 
Defendant MacArthur's loss of control of her vehicle and 
causing it to crash on the roadway left Plaintiff in a dangerous 
situation. While the car was safely travelling on the freeway, the 
risk of the type of injury incurred herein was nonexistent. 
However, once the vehicle crashed and came to a stop on the 
freeway, there was a substantial risk of further injury as a result 
of subsequent drivers coming upon the scene of the accident. 
It would seem reasonably foreseeable to any prudent person, 
that leaving a person on an icy freeway, either on foot or in a 
vehicle, would foreseeably result in injury to that person. 
Defendant MacArthur is now asking this Court to determine as a 
matter of law that under the comparative negligence doctrine a jury 
should not be allowed to decide her negligence. Such questions are 
properly questions for the jury. Harris, at 222. 
It should be noted that the conduct of MacArthur increased the 
risk to Plaintiff and certainly was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm ultimately suffered by the Plaintiff in 
this case. Under the Restatement, the fact that the harm is 
brought about through the intervention of another force does not 
relieve Defendant MacArthur of liability. 
Additionally, Defendant states that Plaintiff exited the 
vehicle onto a dark icy freeway. While that fact has not been 
23 
established, and has been contested, even the act of leaving the 
vehicle would not relieve Defendant MacArthur from being found to 
have been the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. 
The Restatement of Torts provides: 
SECTION 444. Acts Done Under Impulsion of Emotional 
Disturbance 
An act done by another in normal response to fear or emotional 
disturbance to which the actors negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in subjecting the other is not a superseding cause of harm 
done by the other's act to himself or a third person. 
The issue is whether, assuming the negligent crash of 
Defendant MacArthur, her proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries is 
cut off by his exiting the vehicle after the crash. The deposition 
testimony, and facts previously available, indicate that Defendant 
Gilbert was stalled on the freeway. Plaintiff had a specific 
recollection that he needed to help Defendant Gilbert or someone 
was going to get hurt. Plaintiff Clark would not have been subject 
to the sudden urge and desire to help Defendant Gilbert, had 
MacArthur not crashed her car on the freeway, directly opposite 
Gilbert's location. The response of Plaintiff, to get out of the 
car and help other people so that no one would be hurt, would be a 
normal response to the dangerous situation created by Gilbert and 
to which Plaintiff was subjected as a direct result of the 
negligent acts of Defendant MacArthur. 
The question of proximate cause is a question of fact to be 
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determined by the jury. Although Defendant MacArthur claims her 
negligence had "come to a rest" that is the first prong of the 
Hillvard test which was overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Harris. Neither the actions of any intervening negligent party, 
nor the alleged negligence of Plaintiff are sufficiently 
unforeseeable to allow the court to determine as a matter of law 
that Defendant MacArthur was not a concurrent and/or contributing 
cause to the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. Because questions of 
fact exist and the law provides that proximate cause is a question 
of fact for the jury, this court should reverse Defendant 
MacArthur's Order of Summary Judgment. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE WOOLSTENHULME WAS IMPROPER 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that summary 
judgment should be granted in negligence cases only in the "most 
clear instances." English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); 
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); see also Apache 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Because Utah is a 
comparative negligence state. Where there are legitimate 
inferences that multiple parties were negligent, it is not for a 
court to decide the case as a matter of law. The task of measuring 
the relative degree of negligence is for the trier of fact. The 
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Supreme Court has held: 
Even though plaintiff may have been negligent, 
summary judgment is an altogether inappropriate procedure 
for assessing her degree of negligence against the 
negligence of the defendants. In the days when 
contributory negligence was an absolute defense in a 
negligence action, summary judgment could be used to 
dispose of negligence actions without depriving a 
plaintiff of his right to a trial on the merits. Now, 
however, contributory negligence is not an absolute 
defense, and summary judgment is rarely an appropriate 
remedy for resolving negligence actions. 
English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993), quoting Williams v. 
Melvv, 699 P.2d at 723 (Utah 1985) 
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should be taken from the 
jury only where: (1) there is no evidence to establish a causal 
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) 
where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be 
derived from the evidence on proximate causation. Steffensen v. 
Smiths Management Corp. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App 1991); Robertson v. 
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, (Az 1990). 
There is substantial evidence to establish a causal connection 
in this case. Plaintiff's expert stated "the most probable 
mechanism of the injuries was the sequence of crashes caused by the 
Woolstenhulme truck" (R.620 f5) . Plaintiff remembers seeing 
Gilbert approach the vehicle and reaching for door with the intent 
to get out and then blacking out. (Clark p.61 1.13-21). 
Woolstenhulme's truck then collides with MacArthur's vehicle and 
strikes a person believed to be either Gilbert or Brad Clark (DuVal 
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p.63 1.20-21) . "Brad had to be out of the car and moving somewhere 
in that area. But he was hit at about the same time the MacArthur 
car was hit. . . But the impact between Woolstenhulme and MacArthur 
would appear, due to the force involved, as the one that caused him 
to be hurt." (DuVal p.60 1.1-11). 
There is amble evidence upon which a jury could find appellee 
Woolstenhulme was negligent and his negligence was the proximate 
cause of injuries to Brad Clark. The granting of summary judgment 
in favor of appellee Woolstenhulme should be reversed. 
POINT V 
QUESTIONS OP PACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
APPELLEE COLOVICH 
The Court held in its ruling in this case that the jury would 
be left to speculate as to the issue of probable cause as to all 
Defendants. There was adequate evidence before the court that the 
negligence of appellee Colovich caused or contributed to the 
injuries suffered by Brad Clark. 
Colovich relies upon Mitchell v. Pearson Enterp.. supra, for 
the proposition that Plaintiff must produce evidence that the 
negligence, if any, has a causal connection with Plaintiff's 
injuries. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P. 2d 240 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment 
for defendant on the issue of proximate causation because the court 
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found no evidence of proximate cause and determined thatf without 
evidence, the issue would have been left to juror speculation. In 
Mitchell, dependents of a murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful 
death action against the hotel after the deceased had been 
unexplainedly murdered in his hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to 
prove that the hotel management was negligent in its security 
measures and that such negligence proximately caused the murder. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's summary 
judgment for the defendant. The court held that because there was 
no evidence as to how the murderer entered the deceased's room, 
plaintiffs had failed to show a factual connection between the 
negligent security measures and the murder. The Mitchell court 
recognized that the murderer could have entered the room in a 
number of ways, many of which would have had no connection with the 
hotel's security measures, including by invitation of the deceased. 
Because plaintiffs bore the burden to show defendant's conduct was 
a "substantial causative factor that led to the [guest's) death," 
id. at 246, and because plaintiffs had offered no evidence other 
than mere speculation as to how the murderer got in the room, 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation was proper. 
In Mitchell the Plaintiff was unable to establish how the 
perpetrator entered the victim's room. Some question was raised 
whether the parties were friends, whether the perpetrator had been 
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invited into the room, or had otherwise arrived. In the present 
case, the testimony of Dave Stephens was reasonably clear that Brad 
Clark was either struck by appellee Colovich, struck by jeep which 
was struck by appellee Colovich, or struck by MacArthur's car after 
being hit by the jeep. The jeep was stopped on the roadway before 
being hit by appellee Colovich. 
It was the deposition of David Stephens that Brad Clark was 
hit by appellee Colovich's Buick or hit by Hopkins' jeep which had 
been hit by appellee Colovich's Buick. (deposition of Stephens p.37 
1.25 et seq). 
Summary judgment is available "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file,, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, a court must consider all of 
the facts and evidence presented, and every reasonable 
inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion. Bowen v. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Morris v. Farnsworth Motel. 259 
P.2d 297 (1953). 
Katzenberger v. State of Utah ,735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987); 
Based upon the evidence which was presented to the trial 
court, a reasonable inference arises that Plaintiff was injured as 
a result of a direct collision or a result of the collision 
sequence initiated by appellee Colovich. There were adequate facts 
from which a jury could determine that appellee Colovich caused or 
contributed significantly to the injuries and damages suffered by 
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Brad Clark. 
Summary judgment in favor of appellee Colovich was improper 
when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. 
That ruling should be set aside and this matter should be remanded 
for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff requests this Court to set aside the rulings of the 
trial court and remand this case for trial. Appellees Farmers 
Insurance and MacArthur have obtained summary judgment on a theory 
of negligence coming to a rest and superseding intervening cause. 
Those theories were overruled by the Supreme Court which held the 
issues constituted a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
This Court should also set aside summary judgment for appellee 
Woolstenhulme and Colovich as adequate evidence exists regarding 
the negligence and causation of each of these appellees to justify 
the case being submitted to the jury. 
DATED AND SIGNED this ,-7 '"  day of July, 1994. 
JAMES G. CLARK 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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A-1. The Court's Ruling of April 22. 1993 
Bwrti vkjAciaMWrict Court of 
Utab Couaty. SUi* ol Utah. 
CARMA B. SMITH. Ork 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, etal., 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by 
Defendant Farmer's Insurance Exchange, On April 15, 1993, the Court heard oral 
argument on the motions. The Court, having duly considered the arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
RULING 
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.Pro 
56. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts 
sufficient to support a finding of (1) a duty to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal 
link between the negligent conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by plaintiff, and 
(4) damages. The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged by plaintiff, whether 
plaintiff's allegations can support a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. For 
">. 
the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will assume without deciding that plaintiff 
has alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendants. 
Proximate causation can be defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without 
which'the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell at 245-46. Additionally, 
plaintiff bears the burden to show initially that the defendants conduct was a "substantial 
causative factor" leading to plaintiffs injury. Mitchell at 246. 
This case can be compared to the facts in Mitchell. In Mitchell, plaintiffs brought a 
wrongful death action after Mr, Mitchell was found dead in his hotel room. Plaintiffs were 
successful in alleging facts sufficient to establish negligent conduct but the court determined 
that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any direct evidence linking Mitchell's death and the 
alleged negligent conduct. The court found that since there was an absence of direct 
evidence on causation, the jury would be left to speculation. Mitchell at 246. The court 
stated that "[w]hen proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a 
matter of law." ]d.; Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1982). 
While it is true that the issue of proximate cause is generally considered a question of 
fact, the court may take the question away from the factfinder when appropriate. Mitchell 
v. Pearson Enterprises. 687 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). See also Steffensen v. Smith's 
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Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If reasonable inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence, then the matter should be put to the factfinder. Steffensen. at 486. 
But in the absence of proof on the issue of causation, there is no evidence upon which a jury 
could make reasonable inferences and hence the jury would be left to speculate on the issue 
of causation. 
After considering the arguments and extensive briefs presented by counsel, the Court 
determines that as to defendants Farmer's Insurance, State Farm Insurance, MacArthur, 
Colovich, and Hopkin no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as to these 
defendants. In fact, plaintiffs own expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition whether 
he would be able to determine the mechanism of plaintiffs injury without speculating or 
guessing. His response was "no." 
This Court has been unable to determine from the arguments presented any exact 
mechanism for plaintiffs injury. The Court finds that any finding as to proximate cause 
would be the result of speculation. This case, under plaintiffs present theories, would not 
only be problematic for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach 
a verdict. That result would not be fair, nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties. 
Accordingly, the Court grants these defendants 's Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
Court denies defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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A-2. Court's Minute Entry, Sua Sponte, To Amend 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Cout 
Utah Cowrty, Stoto ot Utah. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
CARMA B. SMITH. Ctark 
BRADLEY CLARK 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FARMER'S INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
et. al., 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
The Court has recently entered a ruling in the the above case. The Court has granted 
summary judgment to all the defendants, except defendant Gilbert. The Court inadvertently 
failed to include defendant Woolstenhulme motion for summary judgment as being included 
in the granting of summary judgment. The Court will include an Amended Ruling on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which includes the granting of summary 
judgment to defendant Woolstenhulme. 
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A-3. Court's Amended Ruling on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
F I L E 0 
• —rth Judicial 0»£' ; ' r'~urt 
i. « CouAiy, Stat*. wi. 
SARMA a. 8MiT.-.. Cierk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, etal., 
Defendant. 
AMENDED RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by 
Defendants Farmer's Insurance Exchange, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, MacArthur, Colovich, Hopkins, Gilbert and Woostenhulm. On April 15, 1993, 
the Court heard oral argument on the motions. The Court, having duly considered the 
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
RULING 
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.Pro 
56. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts 
sufficient to support a finding of (1) a duty to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal 
link between the negligent conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by plaintiff, and 
(4) damages. The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged by plaintiff, whether 
plaintiffs allegations can support a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. For 
the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will assume without deciding that plaintiff 
has alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendants. 
Proximate causation can be defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause — the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell at 245-46. Additionally, 
plaintiff bears the burden to show initially that the defendants conduct was a "substantial 
causative factor" leading to plaintiffs injury. Mitchell at 246. 
This case can be compared to the facts in Mitchell. In Mitchell, plaintiffs brought a 
wrongful death action after Mr. Mitchell was found dead in his hotel room. Plaintiffs were 
successful in alleging facts sufficient to establish negligent conduct but the court determined 
that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any direct evidence linking Mitchell's death and the 
alleged negligent conduct. The court found that since there was an absence of direct 
evidence on causation, the jury would be left to speculation. Mitchell at 246. The court 
stated that "[w]hen proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a 
matter of law." Id.; Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1982). 
While it is true that the issue of proximate cause is generally considered a question of 
fact, the court may take the question away from the factfinder when appropriate. Mitchell 
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v. Pearson Enterprises, 687 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). See also Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If reasonable inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence, then the matter should be put to the factfinder. Steffensen. at 486. 
But in the absence of proof on the issue of causation, there is no evidence upon which a jury 
could make reasonable inferences and hence the jury would be left to speculate on the issue 
of causation. 
After considering the arguments and extensive briefs presented by counsel, the Court 
determines that as to defendants Farmer's Insurance, State Farm Insurance, MacArthur, 
Colovich, Hopkin, and Woolstenhulme no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as 
to these defendants. In fact, plaintiff's own expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition 
whether he would be able to determine the mechanism of plaintiffs injury without 
speculating or guessing. His response was "no." 
This Court has been unable to determine from the arguments presented any exact 
mechanism for plaintiffs injury. The Court finds that any finding as to proximate cause 
would be the result of speculation. This case, under plaintiffs present theories, would not 
only be problematic for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach 
a verdict. That result would not be fair, nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties. 
Accordingly, the Court grants these defendants 's Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
Court denies defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Dated at Provo, this^f day of ST^' £ - , 1993. 
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BY THE COURT 
^Jt&ge Lynn W. Davis 
cc: James G. Clark, Esq. 
Richard K. Spratley, Esq. 
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq. 
Michael P. Zaccheo, Esq. 
Aaron Alma Nelson, Esq. 
Paul M. Belnap, Esq. 
D. Richard Smith, Esq. 
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ROBERT L. JEFFS, #4349 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Farmers Insurance Exchange and 
Jennifer MacArthur 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
•••->.' I5.&(L 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H. 
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON 
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S. 
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, 
DAREN G. WOOLSTENHULME, 
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M. 
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and 
JOHN Does 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came regularly and duly before the Court on April 15, 1993, on 
Defendants', Farmers Insurance Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, 
Donald S. Colovich, Marcus Gilbert and Jennifer MacArthur, Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel in appearance were James G. Clark, counsel for Plaintiff; Mark Taylor, counsel for 
Donald S. Colovich; Michael P. Zaccheo, counsel for Daren G. Woolstenhulme; Harold 
Peterson, counsel for Marcus Gilbert; Paul M. Belnap, counsel for State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company; and Robert L. Jeffs, counsel for Farmers Insurance Exchange 
and Jennifer MacArthur. The Court having considered the memoranda filed and the arguments 
of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
The Court hereby denies Defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court hereby grants the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer 
MacArthur dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint against said Defendants, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer 
MacArthur with prejudice, and awarding costs to Defendants as follows: Defendants, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange and Jennifer MacArthur the sum of $ /, £ /%/>^Defendant, State Farm 
Insurance the sum of $ • ; Defendant, Daren G. Woolstenhulme the sum of 
$ / ^ / ^ f ; and Defendant, Donald S. Colovich the sum of $ / ^ C < £ 7 
.•*-*&^ \^77r^A— 
DATED and signed this V _ E _ l ^ & y o f February, 1994. 
\ \ BY THE COURT 
Lynn W. Davis 
District Judge 
Dated at Provo, this £ £ day of /^&*' £~ , 1993. 
cc: James G. Clark, Esq. 
Richard K. Spratley, Esq. 
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq. 
Michael P. Zaccheo, Esq. 
Aaron Alma Nelson, Esq. 
Paul M. Belnap, Esq. 
D. Richard Smith, Esq. 
BY THE COURT 
/ Judge Lynn W. Davis 
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ROBERT L. JEFFS, #4349 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Farmers Insurance Exchange and 
Jennifer MacArthur 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, | 
vs. | 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, | 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H. | 
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON 
V. HOLBROOK. DONALD S. | 
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, 
DAREN G. WOOLSTENHULME, | 
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M. 
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST | 
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and 
JOHN Does 1 through 5, | Civil No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendants. I 
This matter came regularly and duly before the Court on April 15, 1993, on 
Defendants', Farmers Insurance Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, 
FILED (J mm 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County Stat© oKJi 
CARMA B. SMt 
Dftputv 
Donald S. Colovich, Marcus Gilbert and Jennifer MacArthur, Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel in appearance were James G. Clark, counsel for Plaintiff; Mark Taylor, counsel for 
Donald S. Colovich; Michael P. Zaccheo, counsel for Daren G. Woolstenhulme; Harold 
Peterson, counsel for Marcus Gilbert; Paul M. Belnap, counsel for State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company; and Robert L. Jeffs, counsel for Farmers Insurance Exchange 
and Jennifer MacArthur. The Court having considered the memoranda filed and the arguments 
of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows; 
The Court hereby denies Defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court hereby grants the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer 
MacArthur dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint against said Defendants, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer 
MacArthur with prejudice, and awarding said Defendants costs against Plaintiff as may be 
hereafter established. 
DATED and signed this / J 7 day of February, 1994. 
/ . . * \ BY THE COURT 
W. Davis 
District Judge 
? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENT APPENDIX, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Robert L. Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
PO Box 888 
Provo UT 84603 
Michael P. Zaccheo 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
PO BOX 2465 
SLC UT 84110-2465 
Mark J. Taylor 
4021 S 700 E #420 
SLC UT 84107 
DATED AND SIGNED this. J*~- day of August, 1994. 
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